Jonathan V. Gould
Comptroller of the Currency
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
400 7th Street SW
Washington, DC 20219
Via: Federal eRulemaking Portal – Regulations.gov
Re: Office of Comptroller of the Currency Permitted Payment Stablecoin Issuer Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism and Sanctions Compliance Risk Management Notice of Proposed Rulemaking [Docket ID OCC-2026-0463]
Dear Comptroller Gould:
The National Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC) appreciates the opportunity to comment on the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) issued by the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) regarding Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism and Sanctions and the questions posed therein[1] related the implementation of the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act (GENIUS Act).
NCRC is a network of more than 700 community-based organizations dedicated to creating a nation that not only promises but delivers opportunities for all Americans to build wealth and attain a high quality of life. We work with community leaders and policymakers to advance solutions and build the will to solve America’s persistent racial and socio-economic wealth, income, and opportunity divides, and to make a Just Economy a national priority and a local reality.
The OCC AML/CFT NPRM: (1) seeks to address the GENIUS Act’s requirement for the OCC to issue regulations implementing Bank Secrecy Act and sanctions compliance standards by incorporating the requirements of the Treasury AML and Sanctions Compliance proposed rule[2] and asks several related questions and (2) asks several more general questions pertaining to the OCC’s GENIUS Act Implementation proposed rule, the comment period for which closed in May.[3] NCRC previously commented on the OCC’s GENIUS Act Implementation NPRM.[4]
NCRC believes the NPRM takes important steps to further regulate stablecoin issuers, but it does not adequately address the risks of the secondary market. NCRC urges the OCC to:
- Require stablecoin issuers to monitor the secondary market for anti-money laundering and counter financial terrorism regulatory risks, given the secondary market’s heightened illicit finance risk.
- Create regulatory framework that holds nonbank stablecoin issuers to the same standards as banks to avoid creating a dynamic that accelerates the flight of deposits and contributes to the reduction in the flow of capital to communities.
- Impose additional stablecoin reserve requirements on stablecoin issuers including, requirements to map reserve assets held in omnibus accounts, prohibitions, and limitations on certain types of fees, and obligations to ensure disclosures are made to holders in their secondary market.
- Hold stablecoin issuers responsible for redemptions regardless of how the holder obtained the stablecoin.
- AML/CFT: OCC should require stablecoin issuers to monitor their secondary markets for anti-money laundering and counter financial terrorism risks; framework must not accelerate flight of deposits and reduction in capital.
Instituting uniform anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism and sanctions compliance requirements for permitted payment stablecoin issuers (PPSIs or issuers) is a desired outcome. However, the Treasury AML/CFT requirements do not adequately address the risks of the secondary stablecoin market.
The Treasury AML/CFT NPRM draws a distinction between the primary and secondary stablecoin market. A PPSI’s primary market consists of the users or holders of its stablecoin with whom it has a direct relationship, such as through direct stablecoin purchase, while a PPSI’s secondary market consists of the users or holders who purchase its stablecoin through an intermediary, a digital asset exchange, self-hosted wallet, or through a peer-to-peer exchange.[5] That NPRM specifically limits PPSI’s monitoring responsibilities to the primary market and does not require PPSIs to file suspicious activity reports on secondary market transactions,[6] despite FinCEN concluding that “the majority of illicit activity involving stablecoins occurs on the secondary market.”[7]
FinCEN’s conclusion is consistent with the recent Financial Action Task Force report that found “stablecoins are the most popular virtual asset used in illicit transactions.”[8] Its March report notes that peer to peer transactions via unhosted wallets are a key vulnerability and recommends imposing AML/CFT obligations on issuers, intermediaries and custodians to mitigate that risk.[9]
By adopting the Treasury AML/CFT NPRM’s requirements, the OCC would inherit a regulatory regime that does not adequately address the risks of the secondary stablecoin market. Given the risks, the OCC should require PPSIs to establish and maintain AML/CFT programs that monitor the PPSI’s secondary market risk and require them to file SARs when warranted. In addition, to the extent the secondary market players such as intermediaries or exchanges act as service providers for the PPSI, then the OCC should require PPSIs to ensure that those third parties comply with the BSA.
In finalizing the framework for AML/CFT compliance by PPSIs, we urge the OCC to hold nonbank PPSIs to the same exacting standards to which regulators hold banks and other regulated financial institutions. Uniform and consistent requirements should be applied regardless of the entity type – all should be held to the highest standards without exception.[10] When PPSIs operate under weaker standards and avoid safeguards required of other financial institutions, the result may be faster stablecoin adoption without equivalent protections for consumers or communities. As NCRC warned in its previous comment letter, this dynamic could accelerate a flight of deposits out of traditional banks and into stablecoin products, reducing the pool of funds available to support household, small-business and community lending. In turn, stablecoin issuers would benefit from these inflows without assuming comparable responsibilities to the public.
- Reserves: The OCC should impose additional stablecoin reserve requirements, including requiring the mapping of reserve assets held in omnibus accounts, prohibiting and limiting certain types of fees, and requiring disclosures to secondary market participants.
The OCC AML/CFT NPRM asks whether the OCC should add requirements regarding PPSI’s reserves, specifically about the identifiability of reserve assets. Question 3 implies that identification relates to whether and when income, interest, or other proceeds generated by reserve assets are considered reserve assets. NCRC agrees that it is important for PPSIs to maintain the appropriate controls and systems necessary to ensure that reserve assets can be traced and identified at all times because it may help ensure reserve funds are ready and available for holder redemption requests.
That said, in the context of omnibus reserve accounts held by custodians – as contemplated by the OCC GENIUS Act NPRM[11] – it is also important that PPSIs be able to ensure that reserve assets can be mapped to the correct stablecoin issuer. NCRC’s previous comment letter highlighted the risks of omnibus reserve accounts through the example of Synapse Financial Technologies and its lack of proper omnibus account controls. Synapse was a “banking as a service” business providing online banking services to consumers through its partnerships with FDIC-regulated banks. The banks held the consumers’ funds in commingled or omnibus accounts.[12] When Synapse went bankrupt, its records mapping individual consumer’s account funds to the commingled bank accounts were inadequate and over 100,000 consumers lost access to their funds. No one could identify who owned which assets.[13] In light of the risks associated with omnibus reserve accounts, the AML/CFT OCC NPRM should clarify that PPSIs should not only maintain appropriate controls and systems to ensure reserve assets can be traced and identified – they should be required to ensure that custodians holding their reserve assets in omnibus accounts have the systems in place to trace, identify, and map them to the PPSI.[14]
Question 4 of the OCC AML/CFT NPRM asks whether there should be limits on reserve-related fees, especially fees that a PPSI may impose for managing or trading its own reserve assets.[15] It is inequitable to allow PPSIs to charge fees to manage or trade its own reserve assets. The GENIUS Act requires PPSIs to maintain reserve assets to back the stablecoins they issue and they benefit from any investment decisions they make – including when the value of the underlying assets grows, such as from interest income. On the other hand, holders bear significant risks of PPSI management and trading decisions that result in devaluation of the underlying reserve assets – even the grant of super-priority in bankruptcy by the GENIUS Act does not guarantee stablecoin holders will be made whole. Accordingly, there is no reason for holders to pay fees to PPSIs to engage in their statutory duty to sustain reserve assets for stablecoin redemption. NCRC urges the OCC to prohibit PPSIs from imposing fees for managing or trading its own reserve assets – and frankly, believes that in all circumstances, PPSIs alone should bear the costs of managing or trading its stablecoin reserve assets.
The NPRM further asks whether the OCC should impose disclosure requirements regarding fees. To the extent any reserve-related fees are allowed, as stated in NCRC’s previous comment letter, NCRC urges that the OCC require that fees be reasonable, subject to a regulatory cap, and not eligible for unilateral modification by issuers.[16] While clear and prominent disclosure of any fees to new and existing stablecoin holders is desirable, in this context, it will be essentially impossible unless the PPSI’s duty to provide the disclosures extends to holders of its stablecoin in the secondary market. As previously noted, many holders of stablecoins obtain them through exchanges and other intermediaries. As a result, there is no direct relationship between issuers and many holders. And there are currently no regulatory obligations for exchanges or other third parties that sell the issuer’s stablecoin to make these disclosures to its customers or for the third parties to direct its customers to an issuer’s website. To guarantee appropriate disclosures to the universe of holders of an issuer’s stablecoin, we strongly encourage the OCC to make the issuer responsible – through whatever appropriate means – for ensuring all stablecoin holders receive all appropriate disclosures, regardless of how the holder obtained the stablecoin.
- Redemption: The OCC should hold stablecoin issuers responsible for redemptions regardless of how the holder obtained the stablecoin.
Question 5 acknowledges that not all holders of a permitted payment stablecoin are customers of a PPSI.[17] It asks whether there should be additional “protections in the event that payment stablecoin holders are unable to monetize their payment stablecoins,” including a requirement for direct redemption from a PPSI for indirect customers in certain circumstances, such as where the OCC determines that the PPSI’s direct customers (for example, an exchange) are not adequately facilitating the redemption by holders of the PPSI’s stablecoin. [18] As with the disclosure regime, NCRC believes that the PPSI should be responsible for redemptions of its stablecoin, regardless of how the holder obtained the stablecoin.
It seems like an unnecessary step to require the OCC to determine whether the third party lacks responsiveness to holders of a PPSI’s stablecoin before holding the PPSI responsible for redeeming its stablecoin. The burden of making that determination should rest on the PPSI. The PPSI is the entity responsible for holding the stablecoin reserves and it thus follows that it should be the entity that is ultimately responsible for redeeming its stablecoins. The disconnect is that OCC is not requiring the PPSI to monitor its own secondary market – the third parties, exchanges, the wallets, etc. that sell the PPSI’s stablecoin to others.
The OCC should impose the responsibility on the PPSI for monitoring the redemption request responsiveness of a PPSI’s secondary market and require it to step in to timely process redemption requests from holders in those markets. The OCC then should supervise PPSIs regarding their monitoring and timely processing of redemption requests by holders who obtained its stablecoin through the secondary market. If PPSIs fail to timely redeem such requests, they should lose their status as a PPSI. The absence of such a requirement leaves holders in the lurch and allows PPSIs to hold on to the reserve assets and benefit from them indefinitely. Given that a large percentage of stablecoin holders purchase stablecoin from the secondary market, it is imperative that the OCC hold PPSIs responsible for redeeming all its stablecoin regardless of how the holder obtained the stablecoin.
Conclusion
Given the illicit finance risks in the secondary stablecoin market, NCRC urges the OCC to impose additional requirements on stablecoin issuers, including monitoring its secondary market’s anti-money laundering and counter financing terrorism risks. The nature of the secondary market necessitates making stablecoin issuers ultimately responsible for providing fee disclosures to holders and honoring their redemption requests, regardless of how they obtained the issuer’s stablecoin. With respect to reserve accounts, NCRC believes the OCC should impose additional requirements regarding the mapping reserve assets held in omnibus accounts and prohibit and limit fees, especially fees related to a PPSI’s managing of its own reserve assets. Finally, nonbank stablecoin issuers must be held to the same high standards as banks to avoid creating a dynamic that accelerates the flight of deposits and contributes to the reduction of available credit for household, small-business, and community needs.
Thank you for the opportunity to offer our input on the OCC AML/CFT NPRM. If you have any questions, please contact me at jvantol@ncrc.org, or Tara Flynn at tflynn@ncrc.org.
Thank you for your consideration.
Sincerely,
Jesse Van Tol
NCRC President and CEO
[1] Office of the Comptroller of Currency, Permitted Payment Stablecoin Issuer Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism and Sanctions Compliance Risk Management Notice of Proposed Rulemaking , 91 Fed. Reg. 37840 (proposed June 24, 2026)[hereinafter OCC AML/CFT NPRM].
[2] Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control and Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Permitted Payment Stablecoin Issuer Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism Program and Sanctions Compliance Program Requirements, 91 Fed. Reg. 18582 (proposed Apr. 10, 2026) [hereinafter Treasury AML/CFT NPRM].
[3] Office of the Comptroller of Currency, Implementing the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act for the Issuance of Stablecoins by Entities Subject to the Jurisdiction of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 91 Fed. Reg. 10202 (proposed Mar. 2, 2026).
[4] National Community Reinvestment Coalition, Comment Letter to Office of Comptroller of the Currency Regarding GENIUS Act Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (May 1, 2026), htpps://ncrc.org/ncrc-comment-to-occ-re-genius-act-nprm/. To the extent applicable, NCRC incorporates this comment herein.
[5] Treasury AML/CFT NPRM, 91 Fed Reg 18582, 18585 (Apr. 10, 2026).
[6] Id. at 18592.
[7] Id. at 18601.
[8] Financial Action Task Force, Targeted Update on the FATF Standards on Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers: Peer to Peer Transactions and Stablecoins, (Mar. 2026), www.fatf-gafi.org.
[9] Id. at 5.
[10] See OCC AML/CFT NPRM, Questions 1-2.
[11] OCC GENIUS Act NPRM § 15.22.
[12] FINRA Files Enforcement Action Against Former Synapse Officers over Alleged Supervisory Failures ABA Banking J. (Oct. 1, 2025), https://bankingjournal.aba.com.
[13] Jelle Van Schaick, The Hidden Cost of Pooled Accounts for Platforms, FinExtra (Feb. 8, 2026), https://www.finextra.com.
[14] See OCC AML/ CFT NPRM, Question 4.
[15] Id.
[16] National Community Reinvestment Coalition, Comment Letter to Office of Comptroller of the Currency (May 1, 2026), htpps://ncrc.org/ncrc-comment-to-occ-re-genius-act-nprm/.
[17] OCC AML/CFT AML, Question 5.
[18] Id.
