October 13, 2026
Jonathan V. Gould
Comptroller of the Currency
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
400 7th St., SW
Washington, DC 20219
Via electronic mail: LicensingPublicComments@occ.treas.gov
RE: Public Comment Letter in Opposition to Block’s National Trust Bank Charter Application (2026-Charter-347556).
Dear Comptroller Gould,
The National Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC) opposes the application by Block Inc. for a national trust bank charter under the name Builders Bank & Trust, N.A. (Builders Bank). Block seeks the charter in order to “support Block’s existing digital business and customer base” as well as to provide custody and safekeeping of digital assets, execute customer buy and sell orders for digital assets, execute customer instructions to deposit, withdraw, and transfer digital assets, and provide stablecoin settlement and transfer services.[1] Block is the parent of CashApp and Square.[2]
NCRC is a coalition of more than 700 community-based organizations fighting for a just economy. For nearly 30 years, we have worked to create opportunities for people and communities to build and maintain wealth. NCRC members include community reinvestment organizations, community development corporations, local and state government agencies, faith-based institutions, fair housing and civil rights groups, minority and women-owned business associations, and housing counselors from across the nation.
NCRC has long opposed the grant of national trust bank charters to companies engaged in cryptocurrency activities for several reasons, [3] including: (1) doing so stretches the national trust bank charter beyond its statutory purpose and (2) it potentially would result in the loss of community reinvestment, harm to consumers, and risks to the safety and soundness of the financial system. Of particular concern are recent consumer protection law enforcement actions against Block.
1. The OCC does not have authority to issue national trust bank charters to crypto companies not engaged in fiduciary activities.
The OCC charters national banks under the authority of the National Bank Act of 1864, as amended.[4] The Act limits the OCC’s grant of trust charters to institutions engaged in fiduciary activities.[5] Although the OCC amended its chartering regulations in 2026 to permit national trust banks to engage in nonfiduciary activities, NCRC disagrees with its interpretation of its statutory authority.[6] The Independent Community Bankers of America (ICBA) similarly has challenged the rule in federal court, arguing that it exceeds the authority Congress granted under the National Bank Act.[7]
Section 92a of the National Bank Act authorizes the OCC to issue a special permit allowing a national bank to act as a “trustee, executor, administrator, registrar of stocks and bonds, guardian of estates, assignee, receiver, or in any other fiduciary capacity,” in which competing State-chartered institutions are permitted to act under state law.[8] Section 27(a) allows the OCC to require a national bank’s activities to be limited to those of a trust company.[9] Courts have held that the activities of a trust company referenced in Section 27(a) are defined by the activities outlined in section 92a.[10] Thus, trust companies are only authorized to engage in fiduciary activities.[11]
Block’s application seeks authority for it to provide a variety of services, including those that are not fiduciary in nature, such as custodial services and the provision of stablecoin settlement and transfer services. Although the application references engaging in “fiduciary custody of certain digital assets” and executing customer instructions and orders, the nature of its proposed “fiduciary” services is unclear because a fiduciary is legally bound to manage another person’s money and property for the benefit of the other person, even when contrary to the fiduciary’s own interests.[12] Here it is not clear that in engaging in the proposed activities, Builders Bank would be acting as a true fiduciary. Because Builders Bank’s proposed activities do not appear to be fiduciary in nature, they are inconsistent with the purposes of the National Bank Act, and the OCC would be exceeding its statutory authority if it were to grant Block’s national trust bank charter application.
2. The OCC should carefully evaluate and conduct an independent review of the facts, including the relationships between Block’s subsidiaries’ services and Block’s proposed bank.
The National Bank Act requires OCC review and approval of bank charter applications[13] and its regulations establish the procedures for doing so.[14] As its website notes, OCC’s chartering decisions must be supported by a “sound record of facts”[15] To establish such a record, it is necessary for the OCC to carefully examine the facts applications but also engage in an independent review of them. Here, Block’s application for a trust bank charter references that the proposed Builders Bank would be an uninsured non-depository institution. Yet, it also states that Builders Bank would support Block’s current digital business and customer base. Block’s CashApp platform purports to provide “banking, investing, saving,” and bitcoin buying services.[16] Exactly how the proposed bank will “support” CashApp customers, including whether it will be providing deposit-like accounts to CashApp consumers warrants the OCC’s independent examination and evaluation. It is imperative that the OCC understand how Builders Bank and Block’s subsidiaries would interact prior to acting on Block’s application.
Granting a national trust bank charter would allow Builders Bank to act as a full-service bank but without the corresponding safeguards. For example, although trust banks are not FDIC-insured, the “national bank” label could mislead consumers into expecting federal protection for their deposit-like accounts and expose them to avoidable harm. Moreover, a trust bank charter would convey the appearance of regulatory legitimacy and safety. The application states that Builders Bank will be “a wholly owned subsidiary of Block, held indirectly through intermediate holding companies.”[17] Yet, in addition to there being no FDIC insurance, if Builders Bank were to obtain a specialty national trust bank charter, its parent Block would avoid the consolidated Federal Reserve supervision required of bank holding companies.[18] The interconnectedness between the proposed bank and Block warrants more scrutiny than this type of charter would allow and the OCC should carefully evaluate and conduct an independent review of the relevant facts.
3. If the charter application is approved, Block would avoid obligations justifying the privileges granted to full-service banks, creating regulatory arbitrage that harms communities and consumers.
A national trust charter would provide Block with the reputational benefits, enhanced market credibility, and federal regulatory status of a banking institution while allowing it to avoid many of the fundamental obligations that justify such privileges. This arrangement would create dangerous imbalances in four areas: community investment responsibilities, consumer protection, regulatory oversight and accountability, and systemic risk management. Any form of national bank charter is a privilege, accompanied by obligations to communities and consumers. Approving the application of Block would create a two-tier system where digital asset firms receive comparable federal status without comparable public obligations, undermining the integrity of the entire chartering framework.
3.1. Lost Reinvestment to Communities and the Need for Community Development Obligations
National trust banks are not subject to Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) requirements, meaning granting a national trust bank charter to Block would grant it the prestige and benefits of a federal charter without any obligation to serve entire communities, including low- and moderate-income communities, or meet local credit needs. While traditional banks must demonstrate how they reinvest deposits back into their communities, Builders Bank would face no such requirement, even though it would be holding deposit or deposit-like accounts for consumers. Granting trust bank charters to cryptocurrency companies will give the patina of legitimacy to them without the same obligations to serve the public.
Banks that benefit from federal deposit insurance must meet the credit needs of entire communities, meaning that banks cannot solely serve the wealthiest customers. They must serve the needs of low- and moderate-income households as well. Traditional deposit insurance is a form of public subsidy to the banking industry in exchange for which banks accept obligations to serve the public interest.
Bank deposits provide the capital for funding bank lending activities and community investment and development. If households and business move their capital from bank deposit accounts to digital assets, it will reduce the pool of funds available to support household, small-business, and community lending. And digital asset providers would benefit from the inflows of capital without assuming bank-like responsibilities to meet the credit needs of their communities. The US Treasury’s Borrowing and Advisory Committee estimated that as much as $6.6 trillion in deposits could move from the traditional finance sector into the stablecoin market.[19] While the Independent Community Bankers of America estimates a potential loss of $1.3 trillion in deposits and $850 billion less in community bank lending activity.[20]
Issuance of a trust charter to Builders Bank would legitimize diverting potentially billions of dollars from community bank deposits into cryptocurrency held by an entity with no corresponding community reinvestment obligation. This diversion of capital away from entities with a community reinvestment obligation represents a fundamental departure from the principle that federally chartered institutions should serve public purposes, not merely private profit.
The absence of community development requirements for cryptocurrency companies means communities will lose billions of dollars of needed community and economic development projects and initiatives. The CRA has resulted in nearly $5 trillion in CRA-qualifying mortgages and small business loans from 2010-2024[21] and in 2023 alone, banks originated over $126 billion in loans that meet the CRA’s definition of community development for LMI communities and households.[22]
Considering this, cryptocurrency firms should be required to reinvest a portion of their proceeds into community development projects in underserved communities. Regulators regularly supervise traditional banks for their compliance with the CRA. If subject to similar requirements, regulators could hold cryptocurrency firms accountable for meeting their community investment obligations through a supervisory process. In the absence of community reinvestment requirements, no cryptocurrency firms should receive any form of bank charter. They should not be allowed to avoid CRA requirements, while relying on a supervisory regime that might assure or convey to consumers that cryptocurrency exchanges are a sound way to store and transfer funds.
3.2. Potential for Consumer Harm
As noted in several comment letters submitted by NCRC to the OCC, granting a national trust bank charter to cryptocurrency and stablecoin companies threatens to harm consumers on multiple levels. Fraud, hacking, and cybercrime plague the digital asset ecosystem, with billions of dollars in losses annually. The current regulatory framework governing cryptocurrency and stablecoins fails to prevent massive fraud and financial losses. US consumers are losing billions of dollars a year to fraud, with stablecoins overtaking Bitcoin as the illicit currency of choice for criminals — stablecoins now account for 63% of all illicit crypto transactions.[23]
Block touts that it has been operating in a regulated digital asset services environment for eight years[24] but fails to mention that it recently agreed to pay $45 million to settle allegations by attorneys general in 46 states that Block misled users and failed to protect them from frauds and scams.[25] The states alleged that Block did not require CashApp users to provide identifying information when creating accounts, was aware of sharply rising fraud on its platform, and responded by continuing to market its products aggressively, rather than strengthening consumer protections.[26] They further alleged its customer service support line only had a recorded message and scammers exploited that to feed customers fake support phone numbers that resulted in scammers draining funds from their accounts. In addition, many states alleged CashApp allowed scammers to exploit is marketing campaigns and make misrepresentations about CashApp balances being FDIC insured.[27]
Block’s 2025 settlement with state attorneys general augments its consent order with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) regarding similar practices: failing to provide effective customer service; failing to take timely, appropriate, and effective measures to prevent, detect, limit, and address fraud on the CashApp platform; misrepresenting to consumers the type of protections it provided; and violating the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA) and Regulation E’s requirements regarding error resolution and timely investigation and resolution of disputes about unauthorized transactions.[28] The order required Block to pay up to $120 million in refunds and redress and imposed a $55 million civil money penalty.[29]
In Block’s public application, there is also no mention of a current investigation by the Federal Trade Commission involving consumer complaints raising concerns that “Square accounts were frozen or deactivated, leaving customers unable to reach funds totaling up to $2.5 million, since 2022.”[30]
These enforcement actions and investigations are significant and demonstrate that Block does not have the infrastructure in place to protect its customers and potentially does not have the compliance culture the OCC requires of chartered banking institutions.[31] Both the state attorneys general and the CFPB allege that Block knew of the fraud on its CashApp platform but failed to address it. Particularly troubling is that the issues identified in these matters directly relate to types of services Block intends to offer through its trust bank. For example, Block proposes that its trust bank will offer digital asset safekeeping services. Yet, CashApp, Block’s subsidiary, provides such services for consumers using its platform but failed to safeguard millions of dollars of consumer funds siphoned off through fraud. Similarly, Block’s application proposes that its trust bank would provide digital asset custodial services, but the FTC is currently investigating whether Block’s subsidiary Square is denying customers access to their own funds.
Given the prevalence of fraud in the cryptocurrency ecosystem and the indications that Block does not have the infrastructure in place protect when engaging in the proposed activities, the OCC should deny Block’s trust bank charter application.
3.3. Risks to Safety and Soundness
In addition to the risks Block’s past noncompliance with financial regulations and laws pose, the proposed management structure of Builders Bank also raises concerns. A guiding principle for the OCC when evaluating applications, such as this one, is the maintenance of a safe and sound banking system.[32] Among other things, when evaluating whether to approve an application, the OCC takes into consideration whether the proposed institution will have competent management with the ability to provide the types of services proposed and whether it will be operated in a safe and sound manner.[33]
Here, Block’s application proposes that the same individual act as the Chair of the Board of Directors of the proposed bank, as well as its President, Chief Executive Officer, and Chief Fiduciary Officer.[34] Given the nature of a trust bank, there should be some separation of these roles. Otherwise, the Chief Fiduciary Officer – who is responsible for things like trust administration, fiduciary risk management, compliance with fiduciary law, managing conflicts of interest, and protecting beneficiaries will not be able to escalate concerns to the Board separately. In addition, this individual would essentially be overseeing his own performance. An important internal control is lost by this combination of roles in one person, raising safety and soundness concerns.
Maintaining adequate internal controls is a basic requirement of any business, but such controls are essential for national trust bank charter holders who are supposed to be fiduciaries and custodians of assets. Moreover, adequate controls are important, where the core business involves highly volatile digital assets. Cryptocurrency companies pursue profit-driven business models that are uniquely susceptible to destabilizing runs in the absence of rigorous reserve, redemption, and risk-management standards.[35] Historically, in the US, bright lines have existed to separate banking from commerce. The separation of banking and commerce is critical to maintaining the safety and soundness of our financial system. Granting a national trust bank charter to Block would blur the line and contradict that principle. If Builders Bank receives a charter, regulators will have little insight into Block’s operations including the interconnected relationships between its subsidiaries and the proposed bank, exacerbating potential systemic risks.
Conclusion
NCRC strongly urges the OCC to cease issuing national trust bank charters to cryptocurrency companies because it exceeds its statutory authority and also affords such companies with the benefits of being a national bank but with none of the community investment requirements.
Granting Block’s application for a national trust bank charter would enable reduced investment into community development, risk significant harm to consumers and communities, and create systemic risk. We urge the OCC to deny Block’s application.
Thank you for considering this request. If you have any questions about this letter, please contact me at 202-464-2709 or jvantol@ncrc.org or NCRC’s Policy Director Tara Flynn at tflynn@ncrc.og.
Sincerely,
Jesse Van Tol
President and CEO
National Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC)
[1] Application to the Office of Comptroller of the Currency to Organize Builders Bank & Trust, N.A. 1-2 (Sept. 4, 2026) (hereinafter Application).
[2] Id. at 1.
[3] See., e.g., NCRC Comment Letter in Opposition to Payward Inc.’s National Trust Bank Charter Application (2026-Charter-344995) (June 8, 2026), https://ncrc.org/ncrc-opposes-application-of-kraken-a-crypto-exchange-for-a-national-trust-bank-charter/.
[4] National Bank Act of 1864, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.
[5] Id. § 92a.
[6] See 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(e)(1)(i). The new rule was effective on April 1, 2026. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, National Bank Chartering, 91 Fed. Reg. 9977 (Mar. 2, 2026, final rule).
[7] ICBA v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Case No. 1:26:cv-03441 (D. D.C. Oct. 2, 2026).
[8] 12 U.S.C. § 92a (emphasis added).
[9] 12 U.S.C. § 27(a).
[10] Nat’l State Bank v. Smith, 591 F.2d 233 (3d Cir 1979).
[11] Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Policy Brief: the OCC Has Violated Four Federal Statutes by Allowing National Trust Banks to Engage in Crypto-Related Nonfiduciary Activities, Including the Issuance of Stablecoins 26 (George Washington University School of Law Apr. 2026), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6789822. [hereinafter Wilmarth Article].
[12] See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, What is a Fiduciary?, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-is-a-fiduciary-en-1769/.
[13] National Bank Act of 1864, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.
[14] 12 C.F.R. Part 5.
[15] OCC, Charters & Licensing Overview, https://www.occ.gov/topics/charters-and-licensing/index-charters-licensing.html.
[16] What is Cash App and How Does it Work?, https://cash.app/learn/getting-started/what-is-cash-app-and-how-does -it-work.
[17] Application, at 8.
[18] 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c).
[19] U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee (Apr. 30, 2025), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/221/TBACCharge2Q22025.pdf.
[20] Indep. Cmty. Bankers of Am., Local Lending is At Risk, https://www.icba.org/payment-stablecoins.
[21] NCRC, Benefits of the Community Reinvestment Act, https://ncrc.org/cra.
[22] Fed. Fin. Inst. Exam Council, Findings from 2023 Data Fact Sheet (Nov. 12, 2025), https://www.ffiec.gov/data/cra/findings-from-2023-data-fact-sheet.
[23] Chainalysis, 2025 Crypto Crime Report (Jan. 15, 2025), https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/2025-crypto-crime-report-introduction/.
[24] Application at 1.
[25] Keith Benitez, Cash App Settlement Forces Block to Pay 46 States $45M, Back $120M CFPB Restitution, Tech Times (Aug. 19, 2026), Cash App Settlement Forces Block to Pay 46 States $45M, Back $120M CFPB Restitution; Office of the New York Attorney General, Attorney General James Secures $45 from Block for Enabling Fraud and Misleading Cash App Users, (July 8, 2026), Attorney General James Secures $45 Million from Block for Enabling Fraud and Misleading Cash App Users.
[26] Id.
[27] Id.
[28] CFPB, CFPB Orders Operator of Cash App to Pay$175 Million and Fix its Failures on Fraud (Jan. 15, 2025), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/archive/newsroom/cfpb-orders-operator-of-cash-app-to-pay-175-million-and-fix-its-failures-on-fraud/.
[29] Id.
[30] Chris Tolomia, FTC Investigating Block Over Frozen Square, Cash App Accounts, Yahoo!Finance (Oct. 8, 2026), https://finance.yahoo.com/technology/ai/articles/ftc-investigating-block-over-frozen-180246491.html.
[31] 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(f)(1)(iii) (setting out an OCC guiding principle in the evaluation of charters is ensuring compliance with laws and regulations).
[32] Id. § 5.20(f)(1)(i).
[33] Id. § 5.20(f)(2)(i)(B) and (E).
[34] Application at 3-4.
[35] Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 2024 Annual Report at 8 (U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury 2024). 2024), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/261/FSOC2024AnnualReport.pdf.
