August 4, 2025
Johnathan V. Gould
Comptroller of the Currency
400 7th St., SW
Washington, DC 20219
Via Email: jonathan.gould@occ.treas.gov
Sebastian R. Astrada
Director for Licensing, Midsize, Trust, Credit Card, and Novel Banks
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
400 7th St., SW
Washington, DC 20219
Via Email: sebastian.astrada@occ.treas.gov
RE: Public Comment Letter in Opposition to Ripple National Trust Bank Charter Application (2025-Charter-342347)
Dear Director Estrada,
The National Community Reinvestment Coalition (“NCRC”) strongly opposes the application by Ripple Labs, Inc. (“Ripple”) for a national trust bank charter under the name Ripple National Trust Bank, N.A. (“RNTB”).
NCRC is a coalition of more than 700 community-based organizations that have been fighting for economic justice for almost 30 years. Our mission is to create opportunities for people and communities to build and maintain wealth. NCRC members include community reinvestment organizations, community development corporations, local and state government agencies, faith-based institutions, fair housing and civil rights groups, minority and women-owned business associations, and housing counselors from across the nation. NCRC also partners with many of the nation’s largest national and regional banks to develop Community Benefits Agreements that channel billions of dollars into underserved communities. These partnerships are designed to ensure transparency, accountability, and long-term impact. NCRC’s Innovation Council brings together leaders from financial technology companies to explore innovative, inclusive financial solutions. Each of these networks and partnerships serve as collaborative spaces where stakeholders can share insights, develop strategies, and promote equitable access to financial services.
Granting a national trust bank charter would establish a fiduciary relationship between Ripple and consumers nationwide, allowing Ripple to offer custodial services, hold consumer funds, and manage settlements. The OCC must reject Ripple’s application for a national trust bank charter due to serious concerns regarding Ripple’s disregard for enforcement, governance, compliance, and consumer protection laws.
1. The OCC has ample authority to deny any charter application.
The OCC charters national banks under the authority of the National Bank Act of 1864, as amended.[1] Federal regulations detail the factors and principles that the OCC will consider when reviewing charter applications. The Comptroller’s Licensing Manual further details the considerations involved in the chartering process.[2]
In reviewing charter applications for national banks, including national trust banks, numerous factors and principles guide the OCC[3], the factors and principles that the OCC must consider include:
- Maintaining a safe and sound banking system;[4]
- Encouraging a national bank to provide fair access to financial services by helping to meet the credit needs of its entire community;[5]
- Ensuring compliance with laws and regulations;[6] and
- Promoting fair treatment of customers, including efficiency and better service.[7]
In addition, federal regulations detail the policy considerations that the OCC accounts for when evaluating an application to establish a national bank. The OCC considers whether the proposed institution:
- Has organizers who are familiar with national banking laws and regulations or Federal savings association laws and regulations, respectively;[8]
- Has competent management, including a board of directors, with ability and experience relevant to the types of services to be provided;[9]
- Has capital that is sufficient to support the projected volume and type of business;[10]
- Can reasonably be expected to achieve and maintain profitability;[11]
- Will be operated in a safe and sound manner;[12] and
- Does not have a title that misrepresents the nature of the institution or the services it offers.[13]
The OCC may also consider additional factors listed in section 6 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act[14], including the risk to the Federal deposit insurance fund, and whether the proposed institution’s corporate powers are consistent with the purposes of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, the National Bank Act, and the Home Owners’ Loan Act, as applicable.
In determining whether to approve an application to establish a national bank, the OCC is guided by the goal of maintaining a safe and sound banking system. The OCC approves proposals to establish banks that have a reasonable chance of success, will provide fair access to financial services by helping to meet the credit needs of its entire community (if the bank will extend credit), will ensure compliance with laws and regulations, will promote fair treatment of customers including efficiency and better service, and will foster healthy competition.[15]
In addition, the OCC considers a proposed bank’s plans for meeting the credit needs of its community, including low- and moderate-income (LMI) neighborhoods, consistent with the safe and sound operation of the bank as required by the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA).[16]
The OCC may deny an application, as specified in 12 CFR 5.13(b), based on several factors, including whether significant supervisory, CRA (if applicable), or compliance concerns exist with respect to the filer.[17]
2. Ripple’s history of enforcement actions and litigation creates significant supervisory and compliance concerns, and shows a disregard for regulatory compliance, consumer protection, governance, and risk management.
A history of public enforcement actions and litigation matters raises fundamental questions about the character and fitness of Ripple’s leadership. These actions and cases raise doubts about Ripple’s ability, or willingness, to invest in the creation of adequate internal controls and risk management systems that are necessary for the operation of a national trust bank. Below are details of two recent actions against Ripple or its affiliates, which demonstrate a reckless disregard for regulatory compliance and consumer protection.
2.1 SEC Enforcement Action Against Ripple Labs, Inc. for Unregistered Securities Sales
In December 2020, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed a high-profile enforcement action against Ripple Labs, Inc. The SEC alleged they raised over $1.3 billion through the unregistered offer and sale of XRP, a digital asset the SEC contended constituted a security.[18] In 2023, a federal district court found that Ripple’s institutional sales of XRP did indeed violate federal securities laws, while public exchange sales were not deemed securities offerings. Ripple was ultimately ordered to pay a $125 million penalty and remained subject to an injunction restricting certain XRP-related activities. FinCEN and USAO Sanctions Ripple Labs in Landmark Action for Unregistered Virtual Currency Operations
2.2 FinCEN and USAO Sanctions Ripple Labs in Landmark Action for Unregistered Virtual Currency Operations
In 2015, Ripple Labs Inc. became the subject of a coordinated enforcement action led by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of California (USAO).[19] FinCEN imposed a $700,000 civil penalty against Ripple for operating as an unregistered money services business and failing to implement adequate anti-money laundering (AML) controls—marking the agency’s first civil enforcement action against a virtual currency company. Simultaneously, the USAO entered into a non-prosecution agreement with Ripple, allowing the company to avoid criminal charges in exchange for accepting responsibility and forfeiting $450,000 to the federal government.
Ripple’s history of securities violations raises serious questions about Ripple’s fitness to hold a national trust bank charter, which demands rigorous legal compliance and public trust.
3. Granting a national trust bank charter to any stablecoin issuer would enable regulatory arbitrage that harms communities and consumers.
The granting of a national trust bank charter constitutes a form of public subsidy, providing the recipient with enhanced credibility and competitive positioning in the marketplace. Among the public obligations that come along with the privilege of a bank charter is the obligation to reinvest deposits into the community.
Issuing a stablecoin is functionally similar to printing money and taking deposits, and as such, it carries significant implications for financial stability, consumer protection, and systemic risk. Any entity engaged in currency issuance and deposit-taking, including in the form of issuance of stablecoins, must be held to the same standards as traditional financial institutions. Stablecoin issuers seeking charter benefits should similarly demonstrate their commitment to public welfare through equivalent community investment requirements that ensure public benefit commensurate with the privileges granted.
3.1 Lost Reinvestment to Communities
Ripple’s proposed national trust bank would not be subject to the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). This exemption highlights a critical regulatory gap: the company would receive the reputational and operational benefits of a national bank charter without any reinvestment obligation, most notably, the obligation to support local credit needs or serve low- and moderate-income communities. Approving such a charter risks creating a parallel financial system that enjoys public privileges while avoiding the core public responsibilities that define community banking.
Reinvestment in local communities are core principles of banking and of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) – reinvestment is fundamental to the banking system as a whole. Approving this charter would divert deposits away from regulated banks and into the hands of a private technology giant whose sole objective is profit—not public service or community development.
One analyst has estimated that industry stablecoin supply will reach as much as $4 trillion over the next decade.[20] Although backed by the U.S. dollar, stablecoin reserves are not required to be held as deposits in the US banking system. For example, according to a March 2025 report from Tether, another stablecoin issuer, its reserves are allocated among multiple holdings, including U.S. Treasury Bills, overnight reverse repurchase agreements, money market funds, corporate bonds, funds, precious metals, bitcoin and other digital tokens, and other investments,[21] but not bank deposits.
Because consumers who buy stablecoins are choosing to hold their money as stablecoins instead of depositing it in a bank — and because stablecoin issuers aren’t required to keep the reserves backing those coins in banks — the traditional banking system will lose deposits. In turn, communities across the country will lose reinvestment of those deposits in the form of credit.
3.2 The Need for Community Development Obligations
The CRA states that banks which benefit from federal deposit insurance have an obligation to meet the credit needs of entire communities, meaning that banks cannot solely serve the wealthiest customers. They must serve the needs of low- and moderate-income households as well. Stablecoin issuers should be held to CRA-like standards as they will also rely on a supervisory regime that assures consumers that stablecoins are sound ways to store money.[22]
Traditional deposit insurance is a form of public subsidy to the banking industry and will grant the patina of legitimacy to a national trust bank even if it is only providing custodial services, in exchange for which banks accept obligations to the public interest. The same exchange should apply to stablecoin issuance. Until stablecoin legislation requires stablecoin issuers to reinvest a portion of their proceeds into community development projects in underserved communities, no stablecoin issuer should receive any form of bank charter.
Applying community development obligations to stablecoin issuers would drive billions of dollars into needed community and economic development projects and initiatives. In 2023 alone, banks originated over $127 billion in loans that meet the CRA’s definition of community development for LMI communities and households. In addition, ensuring community development conditions are being met by nonbank or national trust bank issuers would also allow for a more level playing field between banks, especially community banks – and nonbank or national trust bank issuers.
3.3 Embedded in banking laws is the assumption that the deposits held by a bank are insured.
If Ripple’s trust bank charter is approved, it would not be FDIC insured, as the firm does not accept retail deposits. Yet operating under a national bank charter would confer the appearance of regulatory legitimacy and safety—potentially leading consumers to believe their RLUSD holdings are federally protected when they are not.
The National Bank Act (NBA), the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA), and the Federal Reserve Act (FRA) codified the principle that deposit taking is foundational to banking and mandated insurance for national bank deposits. Since then, Congress has passed numerous additional laws reinforcing these concepts.[23]
The Federal Deposit Insurance Act defines the term “deposit” very broadly:
The term deposit: the unpaid balance of money or its equivalent received or held by a bank or savings association in the usual course of business and for which it has given or is obligated to give credit, either conditionally or unconditionally, to a commercial, checking, savings, time, or thrift account, or which is evidenced by its certificate of deposit, thrift certificate, investment certificate, certificate of indebtedness, or other similar name, or a check or draft drawn against a deposit account and certified by the bank or savings association, or a letter of credit or a traveler’s check on which the bank or savings association is primarily liable.[24]
Ripple or other stablecoin issuers might argue that the deposits they hold for consumers are safe because they are backed by the U.S. dollar. Reserves are not the same thing as deposit insurance. Consumers using stablecoins issued by Ripple simply do not have protections that federally insured deposits offer to consumers and there is no information in Ripple’s application to indicate how they will protect consumers from financial losses due to business failures or fraud.
This perception gap increases public exposure to financial loss while allowing Ripple to benefit from the reputational privileges of the federal banking system without offering the core protections that actual banks provide.
3.4 Under current National Bank Charges regulations, Ripple would have no obligation to avoid unfair, deceptive or abusive practices in setting fees.
The OCC’s National Bank Charges regulation is inadequate because it does not require national banks or trust banks to consider key consumer protection principles—such as fairness, affordability, disparate impacts, or the avoidance of unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices—when setting fees.
This regulatory gap is especially concerning in the context of stablecoin issuers like Ripple. If granted, Ripple will operate a national trust bank holding over $60 billion in consumer funds and managing related money transfers, without any obligation under the National Bank Charges regulation to consider the potential for unfair, deceptive or abusive practices when setting fees.
The OCC should not grant national trust bank charters to stablecoin issuers until it amends the National Bank Charges regulation to require consideration of fairness, affordability, disparate impacts and avoidance of unfair, deceptive or abusive practices in setting fees.[25]
3.5 Stablecoin issuers should not be permitted to use a federal trust bank charter to avoid state-level consumer protections.
A national trust bank is not a full-service bank and does not operate under the same regulatory framework as federally insured depository institutions. Granting Ripple a national trust bank charter would allow it to access certain federal privileges—such as preemption of state consumer protection laws—without being subject to the comprehensive oversight and consumer safeguards that apply to traditional banks. The OCC should not permit a stablecoin issuer to use a trust charter as a regulatory shortcut to avoid state-level oversight while lacking the responsibilities and protections associated with insured banking institutions.
4. Granting a national trust bank charter to any stablecoin issuer creates systemic risk
4.1 Risks to Safety and Soundness and Government Bailout
Despite the passage of the GENIUS Act, federal regulators have yet to implement regulations implementing the GENIUS Act, which will be critical to establish clear rules for stablecoins, leaving critical issues of backing, redemption, and oversight in regulatory limbo. While the GENIUS Act proposes basic reserve and disclosure standards for stablecoin issuers, which does not go into effect until January 2027 at the earliest. Even then, legal scholar Art Wilmarth warns that “By placing the federal government’s seal of approval on uninsured and weakly-regulated nonbank stablecoins, the GENIUS Act would greatly increase the likelihood that future runs on stablecoins would trigger systemic financial crises and require costly government bailouts.”[26]
Granting Ripple a trust bank charter before a comprehensive regulatory framework is in place would expose both consumers and the broader financial system to poorly understood risks. Ripple’s proposed banking operations would create an unprecedented moral hazard by extending the federal safety net to a company whose core business involves highly volatile digital assets. Stablecoin issuers like Ripple operate business models that make them uniquely susceptible to runs in the absence of appropriate risk management standards.[27] While these companies typically invest reserves in traditional financial instruments like short-term Treasuries or deposits with regional banks, these connections create dangerous vectors for contagion rather than sources of stability.
4.2 Separation of banking and commerce
In the United States, bright lines have existed to separate banking from commerce. The separation of banking and commerce is critical to maintaining the safety and soundness of our financial system. The national trust bank charter is a problematic contradiction to that principle. If Ripple receives a charter, regulators will have little insight into its corporate parent’s operations even though they have many interdependent relationships.
5. The OCC must deny all stablecoin company charter applications until laws and regulations can effectively address safety and soundness concerns and protect consumers against fraud.
The current regulatory framework governing cryptocurrency and stablecoin is not sufficient to avoid massive fraud and financial losses, nor does it adequately address stablecoin liquidity standards, reserve requirements, or consumer protection.
The digital asset ecosystem that Ripple operates in has been plagued by fraud, hacking, and cybercrime, with billions of dollars in losses annually. US consumers are already losing billions of dollars a year to fraud, with stablecoins overtaking Bitcoin as the illicit currency of choice for criminals.
According to the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) 2024 Internet Crime Report, US consumer losses due to scams are increasing at a startling rate, rising from just under $4 billion in 2020, to over $16 billion in 2024.[28] Cryptocurrency has become the top way that complainants reported financial loss in fraud, accounting for $9.3 billion dollars in losses in 2024 alone.[29] As a group, those over the age of 60 suffered the most losses and submitted the most complaints referencing cryptocurrency.[30] While Bitcoin was the currency of choice for cybercriminals for years, this changed in 2022: a 2025 report shows a seismic shift to stablecoins that now account for 63% of all illicit crypto transactions.[31]
In June of this year, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a leading global financial crime watchdog, recently called on countries to take stronger action to combat illicit finance in crypto assets, warning that gaps in regulation could have global repercussions.[32]
Furthermore, the OCC should also deny all stablecoin company charter applications until the Secretary of the Treasury has finalized rules to implement Section 5(A) of the GENIUS Act. That section of the Act provides that a permitted payment stablecoin issuer shall be treated as a financial institution for purposes of the Bank Secrecy Act, and as such, shall be subject to all federal laws applicable to a financial institution located in the United States relating to economic sanctions, prevention of money laundering, customer identification, and due diligence.
Before the OCC considers granting a charter to any stablecoin issuer, the following rules and regulations implementing provisions of the GENIUS Act must be in place:
- The Federal Reserve Board is authorized to issue regulations related to reserve requirements and liquidity standards for federally regulated stablecoin issuers.[33]
- The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation may issue rules to ensure that insured depository institutions issuing stablecoins comply with capital and risk management standards.[34]
- The Department of the Treasury is authorized to issue rules on consumer protection, including public disclosures of reserve composition, redemption procedures and prohibited marketing practices.[35]
- The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network is authorized to issue implementing regulations under the Bank Secrecy Act to ensure anti-money laundering and sanctions compliance by stablecoin issuers.[36]
- The Secretary of the Treasury is granted broad authority to issue rules and guidance necessary to carry out the act.[37]
6. The comment period for charter applications must be extended to at least 90 days.
A key feature of the American democratic process is the opportunity for public engagement in the lawmaking process and in the American banking law this means the public’s right to participate by submitting comments on charter applications.
Ripple filed the RNTB charter application on July 3, 2025. Around that time, the application appeared in the OCC’s Weekly Bulletin, which also noted that the public comment period would be 30 days, expiring on August 4, 2025. However, the public portions of the application were not available until July 16, 2025, about halfway into the comment period. In addition, the public portions of Ripple’s RNTB charter application contain no information addressing any of the above concerns. A 30-day comment period is simply not sufficient for meaningful public engagement.
We urge the OCC to publicize the nonpublic portions of all stablecoin issuer charter applications (redacting any nonpublic personal information about the proposed entities’ officers or directors).
Finally, we request that the OCC extend the comment periods for all such applications to 90 days.
Conclusion
The OCC must reject Ripple’s application for a national trust bank charter.
Ripple’s history of enforcement actions and litigation shows a disregard for regulatory compliance, consumer protection, governance, and risk management. Ripple has demonstrated that it would not run a responsible bank and should be denied a charter.
Granting a national trust bank charter to Ripple would enable regulatory arbitrage, reduce community development, risk significant harm to consumers and communities, and would create systemic risk.
Finally, until the GENIUS Act is effective and its implementing regulations are finalized, granting a national trust bank charter to a stablecoin issuer will create systemic risk and will fuel illicit finance and fraud that are already wreaking havoc on U.S. consumers.
Thank you for considering this request. If you have any questions about this letter, please contact Jesse Van Tol, NCRC’s Chief Executive Officer, at 202-464-2709 or jvantol@ncrc.org.
Sincerely,
Jesse Van Tol
Chief Executive Officer
NCRC
[1] 12 U.S.C. 1 et seq.
[2] Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Comptroller’s Licensing Manual: Charters. December 2021. https://www.occ.gov/publications-and-resources/publications/comptrollers-licensing-manual/files/charters.pdf
[3] 12 C.F.R. s. 5.20(e).
[4] 12 CFR 5.20(f)(1)(i)
[5] 12 CFR 5.20(f)(1)(ii)
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] 12 CFR 5.20(f)(2)(i)(A)
[9] 12 CFR 5.20(f)(2)(i)(B)
[10] 12 CFR 5.20(f)(2)(i)(C)
[11] 12 CFR 5.20(f)(2)(i)(D)
[12] 12 CFR 5.20(f)(2)(i)(E)
[13] 12 CFR 5.20(f)(2)(i)(F)
[14] 12 U.S.C. 1816
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid., 4.
[17] Ibid., 5.
[18] U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief, SEC v. Ripple Labs, Inc., Bradley Garlinghouse, and Christian A. Larsen, No. 1:20-cv-10832 (S.D.N.Y., December 22, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/files/litigation/complaints/2020/comp-pr2020-338.pdf.
[19] Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), FinCEN Fines Ripple Labs Inc. in First Civil Enforcement Action Against a Virtual Currency Exchanger, news release, May 5, 2015, https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-fines-ripple-labs-inc-first-civil-enforcement-action-against-virtual.
[20] Yahoo Finance, “Stablecoins go mainstream after Ripple’s blockbuster IPO: Here’s what they do,” July 10, 2024, https://finance.yahoo.com/news/stablecoins-go-mainstream-after-Ripples-blockbuster-ipo-heres-what-they-do-152159324.html.Stablecoins go mainstream after Ripple’s blockbuster IPO. Here’s what they do.
[21] Ibid.
[22] For more information on the need for all stablecoin issuers to be held to CRA-like standards, see The Need for Community Development Accountability for Stablecoin Issuers » NCRC.
[23] National Community Reinvestment Coalition, “NCRC, CRL, and NCLC Send Comment Letter Opposing Figure’s Application for a National Bank Charter,” December 8, 2020, https://ncrc.org/ncrc-two-other-consumer-groups-send-comment-letter-opposing-figures-application-for-a-national-bank-charter/#_ftnref3
[24] 12 U.S.C. § 1813(l)
[25] NCLC et al., Comments on EGRPRA review of 12 CFR Part 7, Subpart D (preemption), OCC Docket IS OCC-2023-0016 at 3 (Oct. 30, 2024).
[26]Open Banker, “Congress Must Reject the GENIUS Act and Remove the Dangers Posed by Nonbank Stablecoins” by Art Wilmarth: https://ourfinancialsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/AFR-Factsheet.GENIUS-Acts-Flaws-and-Failures.pdf
[27] Financial Stability Oversight Council, 2024 Annual Report (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2024), 8, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/261/FSOC2024AnnualReport.pdf.
[28] Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2024 Internet Crime Report (Washington, DC: Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2025), 7, https://www.ic3.gov/AnnualReport/Reports/2024_IC3Report.pdf.
[29] Ibid., 3.
[30] Ibid., 35.
[31] Chainalysis, “2025 Crypto Crime Report: Illicit Volumes Portend Record Year as On-Chain Crime Becomes Increasingly Diverse and Professionalized,” January 15, 2025, https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/2025-crypto-crime-report-introduction/
[32] Reuters, “Global financial crime watchdog calls for action on crypto risks,” June 25, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/boards-policy-regulation/global-financial-crime-watchdog-calls-action-crypto-risks-2025-06-26/
[33] GENIUS Act, Sec. 4(e)(2), S.1582, 119th Cong.
[34] GENIUS Act, Sec. 4(e)(3), S.1582, 119th Cong.
[35] GENIUS Act, Sec. 6(a)–(c), S.1582, 119th Cong.
[36] GENIUS Act, Sec. 7(b), S.1582, 119th Cong.
[37] GENIUS Act, Sec. 13(a), S.1582, 119th Cong.
