April 24, 2026
Benjamin W. McDonough
Deputy Secretary
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
Via: online submission to https://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/proposals/and email to publiccomments@frb.gov
RE: Prohibition on Use of Reputation Risk or Other Supervisory Tools to Encourage or Compel Banking Organizations to Engage in Politicized or Unlawful Discrimination (proposed February 26, 2026); 12 CFR Part 262, RIN 7100-AH17, Docket No. R-1884
Dear Deputy Secretary McDonough:
The National Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC) appreciates the opportunity to comment on the proposed rulemaking to prohibit the use of reputation risk by its examiners. NCRC expresses concern with the proposed rule as it will make it more difficult to examine financial institutions for acts of lending discrimination. Banks and other lenders supervised by the Federal Reserve will be less scrutinized for public claims of discrimination that pose potential harm to their reputation and business.
NCRC is a network of more than 700 community-based organizations dedicated to creating a nation that not only promises but delivers opportunities for all Americans to build wealth and attain a high quality of life. We work with community leaders and policymakers to advance solutions and build the will to solve America’s persistent racial and socio-economic wealth, income, and opportunity divides, and to make a Just Economy a national priority and a local reality.
The Role of Reputational Risk in Uncovering Lending Discrimination
The Federal Reserve defines reputational risk as “the potential that negative publicity regarding a banking organization’s business practices, whether true or not, will cause a decline in the banking organization’s customer base, costly litigation, or revenue reductions.” Examiners already evaluate how certain activities or practices can impact an institution’s reputation through traditional risk channels, such as credit risk, market risk, or operational risk. The proposed rule claims that reputational risk plays no role in determining the safety and soundness of an institution.
However, it is inaccurate to state that the reputation of an institution—outside traditional risk channels—cannot have an impact on their safety and soundness. Lenders rely on the confidence of its depositors to continue its overall operations. If a bank’s reputation became associated with an activity deemed negatively by society, such as lending discrimination, it is very likely that depositors would withdraw their funds and seek services from another lender. This would impact the financial condition of the bank and put them at risk of closure.
We express concern that the proposed rule will make it more difficult for examiners to scrutinize financial institutions if their reputation has been tarnished by allegations of discrimination within their community. For example, community groups and media institutions may accuse a bank of refusing to offer full services to residents in a majority-Black neighborhood. Under the proposed rule, Federal Reserve examiners will not probe these potential reputational risk allegations, even though the failure to provide such services in those areas may disproportionately impact consumers in protected classes.
Furthermore, we express concern about the compounding effects of this rule and the CFPB’s final rule to amend Regulation B, which implements the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA). The revised Regulation B limits fair lending enforcement to disparate treatment and eliminates disparate impact liability.
To be actionable under the revised Regulation B, acts of discrimination or discouragement must be overt – such as explicit acts or statements of discrimination. As stated above, a lender may develop a reputation for not opening bank branches in majority-minority census tracts. But if there are not overt acts, such as statements that “we don’t lend to minority-owned small businesses,” the bank’s purported non-discriminatory reason – e.g., profit modeling – will satisfy the new Regulation B standard and examiners will not evaluate data to explore whether there is disparate impact of this practice to consumers. Likewise, under the reputational risk rule, Federal Reserve examiners will not examine the bank’s reputation for failing to offer services in majority-minority census tracks.
The revised Regulation B and the Federal Reserve’s reputational risk rules have a combined effect of allowing predatory lenders to commit more discrimination at the expense of low-to-moderate income (LMI) communities.
As such, we ask that Federal Reserve answer our questions on the enforcement of this rule as it particularly relates to fair lending and consumer protection:
- Under what circumstances will examiners determine whether negative publicity regarding a bank’s business practice impacts the bank’s financial condition?
- When widespread allegations of discrimination damage a bank’s standing in a LMI community, will the examiners be instructed to treat them as compliance, legal, or operational risks? What guidance will you issue?
- Many serious fair-lending and consumer protection problems first show up as community complaints, or media stories instead of immediate capital or earnings impacts. How will the implementation of this proposed rule ensure examiners still treat these community signals as exam input, rather than dismissing them as “reputational issues?”
Conclusion
We urge the Federal Reserve to reconsider this proposed rule and establish clear guidelines for what constitutes a reasonable reputational risk. We encourage a civil rights analysis of this rule to better understand its impact on lending to people of color and LMI populations. Should you have questions you may reach out to Manan Shah, Policy Advisor at mshah@ncrc.org or Eden Forsythe, Chief Policy Counsel at eforsythe@ncrc.org.
Sincerely,
Jesse Van Tol
President & CEO
National Community Reinvestment Coalition
